VA
факап на факапе факапом погоняет
Size: a a a
2020 April 02
E
На доступ долетает, клиенты не мониторятся, но я поставлю пожалуй
на один экран в заббиксе собрать суммы графиков вход-выход по всей цепочке..
если суммарно трафик долетает до абонентов, надо проверить картину на доступе, равномерно ли размазывается по абонентам или строго в какую-то группу или конкретного абонента.
если суммарно трафик долетает до абонентов, надо проверить картину на доступе, равномерно ли размазывается по абонентам или строго в какую-то группу или конкретного абонента.
PL
Кто-нибудь сам смотрел уже, раском был первый или РТК-таки?
MK
Dear colleagues,
Yesterday at 18:17 (UTC+2) we accidentally deleted 4,100 RPKI Route Origin Authorisations (ROAs). These ROAs were related both to members' and sponsored resources. This happened while we were performing maintenance on our internal software. We are currently investigating and will update you when we know more. Apologies for the inconvenience.
Kind regards
Nathalie Trenaman
Routing Security Programme Manager
RIPE NCC
Yesterday at 18:17 (UTC+2) we accidentally deleted 4,100 RPKI Route Origin Authorisations (ROAs). These ROAs were related both to members' and sponsored resources. This happened while we were performing maintenance on our internal software. We are currently investigating and will update you when we know more. Apologies for the inconvenience.
Kind regards
Nathalie Trenaman
Routing Security Programme Manager
RIPE NCC
Натали классная
MK
В райпе мало таких
Y
This is how you deal with route leaks
That, we must say, is the unique story so far.
Here’s the beginning: for approximately an hour, starting at 19:28 UTC on April 1, 2020, the largest Russian ISP — Rostelecom (AS12389) — was announcing prefixes belonging to prominent internet players: Akamai, Cloudflare, Hetzner, Digital Ocean, Amazon AWS, and other famous names.
Before the issue was resolved, paths between the largest cloud networks were somewhat disrupted — the Internet blinked. The route leak was distributed quite well through Rascom (AS20764) , then Cogent (AS174) and in a couple of minutes through Level3 (AS3356) to the world. The issue suddenly became bad enough that it saturated the route decision-making process for a few Tier-1 ISPs.а говорили что ТТК ?
Y
Dear colleagues,
Yesterday at 18:17 (UTC+2) we accidentally deleted 4,100 RPKI Route Origin Authorisations (ROAs). These ROAs were related both to members' and sponsored resources. This happened while we were performing maintenance on our internal software. We are currently investigating and will update you when we know more. Apologies for the inconvenience.
Kind regards
Nathalie Trenaman
Routing Security Programme Manager
RIPE NCC
Yesterday at 18:17 (UTC+2) we accidentally deleted 4,100 RPKI Route Origin Authorisations (ROAs). These ROAs were related both to members' and sponsored resources. This happened while we were performing maintenance on our internal software. We are currently investigating and will update you when we know more. Apologies for the inconvenience.
Kind regards
Nathalie Trenaman
Routing Security Programme Manager
RIPE NCC
потому что сертификата райпа у них не было !
MK
Yaroslav
а говорили что ТТК ?
они на день раньше
Y
тока вчера их поздравляли с 19 летием ip сети - забыл им привет этот передать
VA
IS
лол
Y
некоторые пользователи..
Y
это опять ты штоли?
AD
кстати, а dummy интерфейс он как local или как /dev/null?
как local
I
как local
т.е вместо мозготни с вирт адаптерами, я могу наделать инстансов дамми, а потом их через бридж в инет выпустить?
Y
ну если сетевой инженер, то у тебя нет визио но есть нормальный шел сразу - остальное что не так?